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IMMIGRATION AND NA TURALIZA TION SER VICE v. ELIAS-
ZACARIAS: PARTIALLY CLOSING THE DOOR ON
POLITICAL ASYLUM
INTRODUCTION
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Elias-Zacarias,l the
Supreme Court held that the United States government could le-
gally deport an alien whose desire to remain neutral in his country's
civil war had exposed him to threats of violence and forced con-
scription into a guerrilla army.2 The Court found that the alien's
neutrality did not constitute a "political opinion" for the purposes
of protection under federal immigration law.3 Therefore, the alien
could not be considered a "refugee" eligible for political asylum in
the United States.4
This case marks a significant narrowing of the definition of "ref-
ugee" and will make it harder for applicants for political asylum to
prove that they have suffered "persecution on account of... polit-
ical opinion." The Elias-Zacarias Court also rejected the standard of
review for administrative decision-making used by the majority of
the courts of appeals in reviewing whether an alien can statutorily be
considered a "refugee." 5 In so doing, the Court established a stan-
dard of review that closely approximates an abuse of discretion stan-
dard, effectively limiting the ability of the federal courts to oversee
executive branch immigration policies.6 Elias-Zacarias clearly marks
a turning away from the Court's traditional reluctance to interpret
immigration statutes in a way that results in the deportation of an
alien with a questionable claim. 7
1. 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
2. Id. at 814.
3. See id. at 816.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 815.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (noting "the long-
standing principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in
favor of the alien"); INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966) (holding that any doubt
should be resolved in favor of an alien); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)
(holding that because deportation is a drastic measure, doubts should be resolved in
favor of the alien).
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This Note describes the status of federal immigration law re-
garding political asylum preceding the Elias-Zacarias decision. It
then explores the Court's reasoning behind its decision in Elias-
Zacarias. Finally, this Note concludes by considering the decision's
potential impact on immigration policy and other areas of law.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Jairo Jonathan Elias-Zacarias fled his native Guatemala when he
was eighteen years old, after two armed guerrillas threatened to
force him to join their anti-government efforts.' The guerrillas,
wearing uniforms and with handkerchiefs masking their identities,
came to Elias-Zacarias's home and asked him to join their move-
ment.9 He refused "because the guerrillas were against the govern-
ment and he was afraid that the government would retaliate against
him and his family if he did join the guerrillas."' 0 The guerrillas
accepted his refusal but promised to return later." He left two
months after the guerrillas first appeared,' 2 fearing that the guerril-
las would "take [him] and kill [him]" if he refused them again.' 3
After being apprehended in July 1987 for "entering the United
States without inspection,"'" Elias-Zacarias attempted to avoid de-
portation using two strategies authorized by federal immigration
law: asylum and withholding of deportation."' While the asylum
test is the easier of the two to meet, only withholding of deportation
is nondiscretionary.
To gain political asylum under section 208 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA), aliens must show that they are refugees
according to the statutory definition. Section 101 of the INA defines
"refugee" as:
any person who is outside any country of such person's na-
tionality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is
outside any country in which such person last habitually re-
sided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protec-
tion of, that country because of persecution or a well-
8. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 814-15.
9. See id. at 814.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 814-15.
12. See Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 812
(1992).
13. See Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 816 n.2; id. at 817 (Stevens, J., dissenting).




founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion ....6
Even if an alien meets this standard, the government has discretion
to refuse the refugee asylum.' 7
To gain a withholding of deportation, aliens must show that
their "life or freedom would be threatened in such country on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion. ' 8 If an alien meets this test, the gov-
ernment has no discretion because the statutory language is
mandatory. 9 Aliens may not be deported to the country which
poses the threat; however, they may be deported to another country
where the risk is not present.2 0
Aliens applying for asylum or withholding of deportation are
protected by certain due process requirements. Under the INA,
aliens are entitled to a hearing before an immigration judge from
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). 21 They are also
entitled to appeal the immigration judge's decision to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA or the Board) and, if necessary, to appeal
the BIA ruling to a federal court of appeals. 2
In Elias-Zacarias, the immigration judge denied the alien's appli-
cation for asylum on the grounds that the guerrillas had neither
threatened Elias-Zacarias nor returned to his home as they had
promised.23 At his appeal to the BIA, however, Elias-Zacarias pro-
duced a letter from his father that mentioned several return visits by
16. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A) (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988)).
17. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988). The section reads:
The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically present
in the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of such
alien's status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted asylum in the
discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that such
alien is a refugee within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this title.
Id.
18. See 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988). This provision is the codification of section
243 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
19. See id. ("The Attorney General shall not deport.
20. Id. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428 n.6 (1987) (explaining the
differences between asylum and withholding of deportation).
21. See Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1281 n.4 (9th Cir. 1984) (explain-
ing the two ways in which an alien can have an INS judge review his request: by submit-
ting a written request to the local INS director before formal proceedings begin, or by
filing the request with the docket clerk after formal proceedings begin).
22. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(4) (1988).
23. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 815 (1992).
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the guerrillas. 24 Despite this new evidence, the Board held that
Elias-Zacarias had not shown an objective basis for his fears. 25 It
found that there was no evidence of a pattern of conscription on the
part of the guerrillas in Guatemala. As a result, the Board affirmed
the immigration judge's ruling.26
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the deci-
sion of the BIA,27 finding that Elias-Zacarias had proven an objec-
tive basis of fear by establishing that there existed a pattern of
forced conscription in his native land. 28 The court first determined
that conscription of an unwilling person by a nongovernmental
group was a form of persecution intended to be protected by the
INA.29 The Ninth Circuit then carefully reviewed the BIA's refusal
to grant Elias-Zacarias refugee status and re-applied the federal re-
quirements, this time to the alien's benefit. 30
The Supreme Court granted certiorari3' and reversed the deci-
sion of the Ninth Circuit by a six-to-three vote in a concise opinion
by Justice Scalia.s2 Narrowly reading the language in section 208
requiring "persecution on account of . . .political opinion," the
Court held that Elias-Zacarias' neutrality was not a "political opin-
ion" and, therefore, he had not sufficiently demonstrated a "well-
founded fear" of persecution due to a political opinion.3 ' The
Court also indicated that greater deference was to be accorded to
the BIA decision than that given by the Ninth Circuit. 4 In his dis-
sent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor,
determined that Elias-Zacarias did possess a "well-founded fear" of
persecution based upon his adoption of a neutral position in Guate-
mala's civil war.3 5
24. See Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d at 847.
25. See Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 815.
26. See id. at 815 (noting that the Ninth Circuit "treat[ed] the BIA's denial of the
motion to reopen as an affirmance on the merits of the Immigration Judge's ruling").
27. Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
28. See id. at 848 & n.4 (citing a State Department advisory letter warning of danger-
ous conditions in Guatemala).
29. Id. at 849-52.
30. Id. at 848 (finding that the cumulative evidence "convince[s] us that the Service's
interpretation of the letter is not supported by substantial evidence").
31. 111 S. Ct. 2008 (1991).
32. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 815.
33. Id. at 816.
34. Id. at 815.
35. See id. at 817-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1993]
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II. SUMMARY OF THE REASONING
In Elias-Zacarias, the Court first addressed the alien's argument
that he was expressing a political opinion by refusing to join the
guerrillas.5 6 The Court rejected this proposition on two grounds.
First, the Court argued that a person could wish to avoid forced
conscription for any number of reasons, many of which were not
political in nature.3 7 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, used
Elias-Zacarias' own testimony-that his refusal to join the guerrillas
was motivated by his fear of government retaliation-to show that
Elias-Zacarias was not attempting to make a political statement.3 8
Second, the Court rejected the proposition that a decision to remain
neutral was itself an "affirmative expression of a political opinion"
intended to be protected from persecution." Justice Scalia stated
that this notion "seems to us not ordinarily so. ''4O
The Court then rejected Elias-Zacarias' claim that threatened
conscription constitutes "persecution" under the statute. The guer-
rillas' policy of forced recruitment, according to the majority,
stemmed from a desire and need to fill their army with additional
bodies rather than from any dissatisfaction with the political beliefs
of the conscriptees.4 1 The Court interpreted the "ordinary mean-
ing" of the statute's language to require that the persecution be "on
account of" the "victim's political opinions, not the persecutor's. "42
Thus, Elias-Zacarias failed to meet the standard.43
In so holding, the Court placed a heavy burden on the asylum-
seeker, indicating that Elias-Zacarias must show "compelling" evi-
36. Id. at 816.
37. See id. at 815-16. See also infra text accompanying note 121.
38. Id. at 816.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 816 n.2.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 816 ("[T]he mere existence of a generalized 'political' motive underlying
the guerrillas' forced recruitment is inadequate to establish (and, indeed, goes far to
refute) the proposition that Elias-Zacarias fears persecution on account of political opinion
..... "). Even if the Court had found his neutrality to be a valid political opinion pro-
tected by the statute, Elias-Zacarias would still have failed to meet the standard because
the Court found that his neutrality was not the cause of the persecution. Justice Scalia
explained:
[W]e need not decide whether the evidence compels the conclusion that Elias-
Zacarias held a political opinion. Even if it does, Elias-Zacarias still has to es-
tablish that the record also compels the conclusion that he has a "well-founded
fear" that the guerrillas will persecute him because of that political opinion,
rather than because of his refusal to fight with them.
482 [VOL. 52:478
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dence for reversal of the BIA decision.44 That is, the Court required
him to prove that the BIA's ruling was not "reasonable.- 45 The
Court quoted for emphasis the portion of the INA that requires a
court of appeals to affirm a BIA decision that is "supported by rea-
sonable, substantial and probative evidence on the record consid-
ered as whole."' 46  In interpreting that language, the Court
examined past cases and concluded that Elias-Zacarias could suc-
ceed "only if the evidence presented by Elias-Zacarias was such that
a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude that the requisite
fear of persecution existed."
4 7
III. LEGAL CONTEXT
The two legal strategies used by Elias-Zacarias-seeking asylum
and withholding of deportation-exist in statutory form in the Refu-
gee Act of 1980 (Refugee Act). 48 The Refugee Act marked a major
change in federal immigration law. Prior to its passage, withholding
of deportation was subject to the discretion of the Attorney Gen-
eral.49 The Refugee Act removed the Attorney General's discretion,
making withholding of deportation mandatory for eligible aliens,5 °
thereby bringing United States law into conformance with United
Nations guidelines. 5' In addition, passage of the Refugee Act re-
flected a strong congressional intent to create a more systematic,
consistent and humanitarian asylum policy.52 Congress wanted to
44. Id. at 815 n.1 ("To reverse the BIA finding we must find that the evidence not
only supports that conclusion, but compels it .... ").
45. Id. at 817 ("[I]fhe seeks to obtain judicial reversal of the BIA's determination, he
must show that the evidence he presented was so compelling that no reasonable
factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.").
46. Id. at 815 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) (1988)).
47. Id. (citing NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300
(1939)).
48. The Refugee Act of 1980 §§ 101, 208 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1158
(1988)). See AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. & STEVEN C. BELL, IMMIGRATION PRIMER 193
(1985) ("[N]ot until 1980 was the piecemeal approach to the burgeoning refugee prob-
lem of the modern world addressed in a comprehensive legislative scheme."). The Ref-
ugee Act of 1980 amended several sections of the INA, namely 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1151-
53, 1181-82, 1253-54.
49. J. Michael Cavosie, Defending The Golden Door: The Persistence of Ad Hoc and Ideologi-
cal Decision Making in U.S. Refugee Law, 67 IND. L.J. 411, 421-22 (1992). The Attorney
General delegated his authority to the INS. Id.
50. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428-29 (1987).
51. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 421 n.15 (1984). Article 33.1 of the United Na-
tions Convention required mandatory withholding of deportation for eligible aliens.
Convention Relating to Restatus of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 184 U.N.T.S. 137.
52. See David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohe-
mia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1261-62 (1990) ("[O]ne theme is clear from the legislative
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ensure that American immigration policy would no longer be deter-
mined on an ad hoc basis, which had resulted in both ideologically-
slanted and arbitrary decisions.53
Despite passage of the Refugee Act, critics have charged that
the United States government's asylum policy has remained biased
and overly strict. The government has narrowly interpreted the ref-
ugee definition to exclude thousands of potential refugees.54 For
example, the Bush Administration found the thousands of Haitians
fleeing their country during the last decade to be in search of "eco-
nomic betterment, not political shelter."'5 5 This made deportation
possible. The result in many cases has been that refugees from
countries friendly with the United States have an exceedingly more
difficult time obtaining asylum than those refugees from countries
toward whom the United States is hostile.5 6
A. Supreme Court Clarifications
The Refugee Act created many uncertainties that the courts
have slowly clarified. For example, the Refugee Act did not define
the standards of proof by which aliens must make their cases for
asylum and withholding of deportation. Section 243(h) mandates
history. Congress intended the refugee standards to be applied neutrally and without
ideological bias, in contrast to certain repealed refugee provisions that had made special
provision for persons fleeing Communist countries."); see also Richard K. Preston, Asylum
Adjudications: Do State Department Advisory Opinions Violate Refugees' Rights and U.S. Interna-
tional Obligations?, 45 MD. L. REV. 91, 100 (1986) ("It was hoped that the Refugee Act
would put an end to the geographic and ideological bias of previous refugee admissions
and focus instead on the broader humanitarian concern for those fleeing persecution
anywhere.").
53. See Cavosie, supra note 49, at 425. Cavosie explained: "Congress intended, by
adopting the Convention/Protocol definition, to eliminate the ideologically biased ap-
proach that had previously characterized refugee determinations. In doing so, it gave
notice to immigration authorities that their compliance would be closely monitored
.... .Id. (citations omitted). See also Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1280
(9th Cir. 1984) (describing "our national commitment to human rights and humanita-
rian concerns"). The Refugee Act also constituted another chapter in the historic battle
between Congress and the President for control of the country's immigration policy. See
Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the
Refugee Act of 1980, Immigration & Nationality Symposium, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 10-12
(1981).
54. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 48, at 193-94.
55. Amy Wilentz, Deep Voodoo, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 9, 1992, at 18, 20. During
the 1980s, only I of 24,000 Haitians were admitted to the United States. Id.
56. See Mark Gibney, Who Is Our Favorite Refugee Today?, HUM. RTS., Summer 1988, at
30, 30-33; Cavosie, supra note 49, at 413.
57. Neither section in the Refugee Act of 1980 defines the standard to be used. See
Stevic, 467 U.S. at 421-22 ("The amended § 243(h) . . . makes no mention of a
probability of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution. In short, the text of the
[VOL. 52:478
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withholding of deportation when an "alien's life or freedom would
be threatened.""8 In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stevic,59
the Court found that the "would be threatened" language requires
aliens to show a "clear probability" of a risk6" and that the persecu-
tion was "more likely than not to occur."'6 1
Section 101 of the INA required that aliens show a "well-
founded fear" of persecution in order to be considered refugees for
purposes of asylum.62 The government required the same standard
of proof in asylum cases as in withholding of deportation cases. 63
However, both the Ninth and Seventh Circuits disagreed with the
standard advocated by the government and claimed that the lan-
guage indicated a more generous standard.64 The Supreme Court
agreed with these courts in Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, holding that the "well-founded fear" language es-
tablished a different and less stringent requirement than the "clear
statute simply does not specify how great a possibility of persecution must exist to qual-
ify the alien for withholding of deportation."). See also id. at 424 ("[T]he Refugee Act
itself does not contain any definition of the 'well-founded fear of persecution' language
contained in § 101(a)(42)(A).").
58. Refugee Act of 1980 § 243(h) (amending the INA, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)
(1988)).
59. 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
60. Id. at 413.
61. Id. at 424 ("[W]e do not think there is any serious dispute regarding the meaning
of the clear-probability standard under § 243(h) case law. The question under that stan-
dard is whether it is more likely than not that the alien would be subject to persecu-
tion."). The Stevic Court relied heavily on the fact that the statute required that the alien
"would" face persecution, rather than "might" or "could." Id. at 422. Because § 243(h)
did not mention "refugee" or refer to § 101, "there is no textual basis in the statute for
concluding that the well-founded-fear-of-persecution standard is relevant to a withhold-
ing of deportation claim under § 243(h)." Id. at 423-24.
62. 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (1988).
63. The use of identical standards made practical sense given that the BIA frequently
considered asylum and withholding of deportation applications simultaneously. Until
1980, the BIA had only reviewed withholding cases. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 48,
at 199. The Refugee Act gave jurisdiction over asylum cases for the first time to the
BIA. See Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 566-67 (7th Cir. 1984). At deportation
hearings, the INS treated asylum requests as applications for both asylum and withhold-
ing of deportation. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 48, at 199. Therefore, for each alien
the BIA sought to apply the same standard of proof for both the asylum and withholding
of deportation decisions.
64. For asylum applications, the Ninth Circuit stated that the Refugee Act of 1980
had lessened the standard to one of "well-founded fear" which was more generous than
the "clear probability" standard. See Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1282
(9th Cir. 1984) (citing Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1982)). The Seventh Circuit
stated that the "well-founded fear" standard for asylum was virtually identical to the
"clear probability" standard used for withholding of deportation. Carvajal-Munoz, 743
F.2d at 574-75.
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probability" approach.65 The Court felt that an alien's fear could be
"well-founded" even where the risk of persecution was less than
fifty percent.6 6 Thus, different standards of proof are mandated for
asylum and withholding of deportation applications.67
B. Remaining Uncertainties
Despite the Stevic and Cardoza-Fonseca decisions, there remained
ambiguous language in the Refugee Act to which the circuit courts
gave varying interpretations. 6' The terms that have led to a dispar-
ity among the circuits are "well-founded fear" and "refugee." In
addition, there was continuing disagreement among the circuits as
to the proper standard of review for BIA decisions.
1. Well-Founded Fear.-Although the Supreme Court decided
in Cardoza-Fonseca that "well-founded fear" meant something less
than "clear probability," it refused to define the term any further,69
65. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987).
66. Id. The Cardoza-Fonseca Court explained:
That the fear must be "well-founded" does not alter the obvious focus on the
individual's subjective beliefs, nor does it transform the standard into a "more
likely than not" one. One can certainly have a well-founded fear of an event
happening when there is less than a 50% chance of the occurrence taking place.
Id. The majority relied heavily on the legislative history of the Refugee Act and the
desire of the Congress to adopt the United Nation's definition of "refugee." Id. at 436-
41. The Court stated: "There is simply no room in the United Nations' definition for
concluding that because an applicant only has a 10% chance of being shot, tortured, or
otherwise persecuted, that he or she has no 'well-founded fear' of the event happening."
Id. at 440.
67. No other country utilizes two different standards. See Martin, supra note 52, at
1264.
68. Arthur C. Helton, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca: The Decision and Its Implications, 16
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 35, 51-52 (1987). Apparently in anticipation of Elias-
Zacarias, the article states:
The next set of questions in the asylum area requiring resolution by the federal
courts include further interpretation of the definition of a refugee, the meaning
of "persecution," as well as "social group" and "political opinion" concepts,
and the proper ambit of discretion in asylum adjudications.
Id. at 51.
69. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 448 ("We do not attempt to set forth a detailed de-
scription of how the 'well-founded fear' test should be applied. Instead, we merely hold
that the Immigration Judge and the BIA were incorrect in holding that the two standards
are identical." (footnotes omitted)). In its earlier decision, INS v. Stevic, the Court used
more precise language in describing what was meant by "well-founded fear." The Stevic
Court noted that "[a] more moderate position is that so long as an objective situation is
established by the evidence, it need not be shown that the situation will probably result
in persecution, but it is enough that persecution is a reasonable possibility." 467 U.S.
407, 424-25 (1984). The Cardoza-Fonseca Court reiterated the Stevic Court's "reasonable
possibility" language. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440. See also Gibney, supra note
[VOL. 52:478486
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other than to note that it included both subjective and objective
components.70 In turn, some of the circuit courts have adopted
contradictory definitions of "well-founded fear."'71 The Ninth and
Seventh Circuits have differing standards for the extent to which a
subjective fear must be supported by objective facts. 72 The Fifth
Circuit has emphasized the objective component, finding that a
"well-founded fear" exists if "a reasonable person in the applicant's
circumstances would fear persecution. 7 3  Similarly, the BIA has
adopted this "reasonable person" definition of "well-founded
56, at 32 (declaring that the Cardoza-Fonseca Court left unanswered the question of "what
does constitute a 'well-founded fear' of persecution?").
70. "[T~he reference to 'fear' in the § 208(a) standard obviously makes the eligibility
determination turn to some extent on the subjective mental state of the alien." Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430-31. In his dissent, Justice Powell pointed out that the implica-
tions of the phrase "well-founded," as it modifies "fear," had not been fully considered.
He wrote, "If anything about these statutes is clear, it is that a 'well-founded fear' is
something more than a 'fear.' " Id. at 456 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting). He added that
"the Court gives short shrift to the words 'well-founded,' that clearly require some ob-
jective basis for the alien's fear." Id. at 459. The Supreme Court has yet to decide the
extent to which the subjective element must be buttressed by objective evidence of ac-
tual or potential persecution in the applicant's home country.
71. See Cavosie, supra note 49, at 429-30 (discussing the "reasonable person" test
promulgated after Cardoza-Fonseca). See also Martin, supra note 52, at 1270 ("[T]his
phrase can also take on a variety of shapes, from highly expansive to narrowly crabbed,
often depending, it seems, on whether the speaker wishes to include or exclude a partic-
ular group of claimants.").
72. The Ninth Circuit has required a relatively low standard of proof, stating that an
alien's subjective fear can establish the necessary proof if supported by general indica-
tions of conditions in the home country. See Mendoza Perez v. INS, 902 F.2d 760, 762
(9th Cir. 1990) ("We have allowed '[a]n alien's own testimony regarding the threats [to]
establish[ ] a clear probability of persecution, if credible and supported by general docu-
mentary evidence that the threats should be considered seriously.' ") (quoting Artiga
Turcios v. INS, 829 F.2d 720, 723 (9th Cir. 1987)). See also Rodriguez-Rivera v. INS, 848
F.2d 998, 1001 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that both subjective and objective components
must be found); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1283 n.l 1 (9th Cir. 1984)
("We believe that an evaluation of whether an alien has a well-founded fear includes
consideration of the applicant's state of mind."). In contrast to the Ninth Circuit, the
Seventh Circuit has required a showing of much more specific objective evidence and
has indicated that an applicant's mere claim of persecution is insufficient to meet the
"well-founded fear" requirement. Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 576-77 (7th
Cir. 1984) ("[W]hen objective, corroborative evidence does not exist, petitioner's testi-
mony must describe credibly and persuasively specific, detailed facts that demonstrate ac-
tual persecution on one of the specified grounds or give rise to an inference that some
other good reason exists for petitioner to fear persecution on one of those grounds.")
See also Cavosie, supra note 49, at 415 (describing the interrelation between the subjec-
tive and objective components of the test as follows: " 'Fear' is a state of mind and,
therefore, subjective. It is qualified, however, by 'well-founded,' apparently dictating an
objective determination." (footnotes omitted)).
73. Rojas v. INS, 937 F.2d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Guevara Flones v. INS,
786 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 930 (1987)).
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fear."' 74 The Second, 75 Third, 76 Fourth 77 and Seventh 78 Circuits are
in accord with the BIA's and Fifth Circuit's approach. Perhaps the
strictest requirement for showing a "well-founded" fear is that of
the Sixth and Tenth Circuits, which have required aliens to show
that they possessed "good reason to fear persecution" on one of
several specified grounds. 79 Thus, as one commentator has summa-
rized, "there remains considerable room for dispute over just how
much more of a showing" is required to prove a "well-founded
fear." 80
2. Definition of "Refugee. "--The "refugee" definition in section
101 of the Refugee Act contains several undefined terms, which the
Court had never explored until the Elias-Zacarias decision. Specifi-
cally, the terms "persecution, "8" "social group" and "political opin-
74. See In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 445 (BIA, 1987) ("[A]n applicant for
asylum has established a well-founded fear if he shows that a reasonable person in his
circumstances would fear persecution."). The BIA has taken the definition of "well-
founded fear" one step further by enumerating four elements: (1) The alien possesses a
belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome in others by means of punish-
ment of some sort; (2) the persecutor is aware or could become aware that the alien
possesses this belief or characteristic; (3) the persecutor has the capability of punishing
the alien; and (4) the persecutor has the inclination to punish the alien. See In re R-
0-, No. A-28779166, 1992 BIA LEXIS *5, at *4-5 (Apr. 22, 1992).
75. Melendez v. United States Dep't of Justice, 926 F.2d 211, 215 (2d Cir. 1991)
(quoting Guevara Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 930 (1987)). The Second Circuit explained that "once subjective fear is demon-
strated, the applicant need only show that such fear is grounded in reality to meet the
objective element of the test." Id.
76. Janusiak v. INS, 947 F.2d 46, 47 (3rd Cir. 1991) (applying the "reasonable per-
son" test for determining the existence of "well-founded fear").
77. M.A. v. INS, 899 F.2d 304, 311 (4th Cir. 1990) (following the BIA's "reasonable
person" approach to establish the type of objective evidence necessary to constitute a
subjective "well-founded fear" of persecution).
78. Zulbeari v. INS, 963 F.2d 999, 1000 (7th Cir. 1992) (requiring an alien to show
"a good reason to fear that he or she will be singled out for persecution") (citation
omitted).
79. Youkhanna v. INS, 749 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that, while the
well-founded fear standard is more generous than the "clear probability" standard, an
alien "must still present specific facts through objective evidence if possible, or through
his own persuasive, credible testimony, showing actual persecution, or detailing some
other good reason to fear persecution on one of the specified grounds") (quoting
Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1984)); Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d 702,
707 (10th Cir. 1991) (requiring that the alien present "specific facts" through "objective
evidence" to show there is a "good reason to fear political prosecution").
80. Martin, supra note 52, at 1272.
81. Joni L. Andrioff, Proving the Existence of Persecution in Asylum and Withholding Claims,
62 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 107, 107 (1985) (describing Congress's failure "to define 'perse-
cution' or to explain what circumstances constituted persecution under the Act").
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ion" have spawned controversy and confusion."2 In general, the
Ninth Circuit broadly interpreted the language to make it easier for
aliens to obtain refugee status, while the INS strictly interpreted the
language.
Addressing the political situations in a number of countries,
one commentator recognized "the difficulties of proving individual-
ized persecution in countries where political oppression is non-spe-
cific."'8 3 For that very reason, the Ninth Circuit has found that in
some circumstances political neutrality may constitute "political
opinion" for purposes of political asylum and deportation.8 4 The
Ninth Circuit also recognized that a persecutor could easily inter-
pret a person's neutrality as an expression of political opposition
and hostility.8 5 The First,8 6 Fourth,87 Fifth, 8 and Seventh89 Circuits
82. See The Refugee Act of 1980 §§ 101(a)(42)(A), 243(h), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)
(42)(A), 1253(h) (1988). See Cavosie, supra note 49, at 416-17 ("Persecution based on
'political opinion' is perhaps less readily definable than that based on any of the previous
categories."). As other commentators have explained:
The most troublesome issues arise with regard to the last two bases for perse-
cution [: membership in a particular social group and political opinion]. Ad-
ministrative bodies have been reluctant to identify various discrete but loosely
defined groupings as social groups; among those that have been rejected are
young males in El Salvador, and members of a taxi cooperative in the same
country. The Board of Immigration Appeals, in the latter case, held that perse-
cution of a social group must be motivated by a desire to stamp out an immuta-
ble or common characteristic shared by group members that is so fundamental
to identity or conscience that the members should not be required to change in
order to avoid persecution.
FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 48, at 205.
83. Andrioff, supra note 81, at 124. See Linda Dale Bevis, Comment, "Political Opin-
ions" of Refugees: Interpreting International Sources, 63 WASH. L. REV. 395, 395 (1988). Bevis
states:
In many countries, persons feel compelled by conscience to resist a regime they
believe is oppressive. They may condemn such regime through active resist-
ance, stated neutrality, silence, or refusal to enter military service. They may
even have hostile opinions attributed to them that are not their own.
Id.
84. See Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1987).
85. Id. The Ninth Circuit stated:
At times in the history of persecution the victims have been persons who did
not share the prejudices and enthusiasms of their persecutors. Their opinions
have been politically unacceptable only because of the opposition and hostility
the persecutors have read into their silence or noncommitment to the persecu-
tors' opinions.
Id. See also Desir v. Ichert, 840 F.2d 723, 728 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The relationship between
victim and persecutor is especially significant in situations where the petitioner may not
have overtly given any expression to his opinions, but because of particular acts or cir-
cumstances, certain opinions are attributed to him.").
86. See Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 8 n.6 (1st Cir. 1990). The First Circuit
accepted, for the sake of argument, that "neutrality" constituted a valid "political opin-
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have taken note of, but have not adopted, the Ninth Circuit's find-
ing.90 The government, however, rejected the Ninth Circuit's find-
ing, requiring instead some overt political activity on the part of the
applicant. 9' Neither the courts of appeals nor the INS clearly distin-
guished between aliens who had been overtly neutral (e.g., a vocal
conscientious objector) and those who had quietly chosen not to
take sides.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit found that "persecution on ac-
count of. . . political opinion" can be based on the political motives
of the persecutor.92 That is, a guerrilla group's attempt to conscript
citizens would be political persecution if the guerrillas' general pur-
pose was political. The Eleventh Circuit found that proposition
dangerously expansive.9" Similarly, the government recently ar-
gued that this interpretation would allow "draft dodgers" to be eli-
ion." Id. at 6. However, the court found no evidence that neutrals in the Salvadoran
civil war were persecuted in retaliation for their neutrality by either of the opposing
forces. Id. Cf. Novoa-Umania v. INS, 896 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1990) ("We assume, as the
Board apparently did, that in appropriate circumstances 'neutrality' may fall within the
scope of the statute's words 'on account of. . . political opinion.' "). The Novoa-Umania
court then described three findings in which neutrality would meet the definition:
1) that a group with the power to persecute him intends to do so specifically
because the group dislikes neutrals, or 2) that such a group intends to perse-
cute him because he will not accept its political point of view, or 3) that one or
more such groups intend to persecute him because each (incorrectly) thinks he
holds the political views of the other side.
Id.
87. See Cruz-Lopez v. INS, 802 F.2d 1518, 1520 n.3 (4th Cir. 1986) (declaring that
the court had no opinion as to whether political neutrality constituted a valid "political
opinion" under the Immigration and Nationality Act).
88. See Campos-Guerdado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 1987) ("Under ex-
treme circumstances .... the [INS] cannot presume that people without overt political
activity, or lacking minority political opinions, will not be the victims of political persecu-
tion." (citation omitted)).
89. See Zalega v. INS, 916 F.2d 1257, 1258 n.2 (7th Cir. 1990) (affirming the BIA's
decision denying asylum and withholding of deportation to an alien who refused to sign
an oath of loyalty to the government). In Zalega, the Seventh Circuit stated: " 'Persecu-
tion' is not defined in the Immigration Act, but has been defined as the infliction of
suffering or harm upon those who differ (in race, religion, or political opinion) in a way
regarded as offensive." Id. at 1260.
90. See Carolyn P. Blum, The Ninth Circuit & the Protection of Asylum Seekers Since the
Passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 327, 352 (1986). Blum explains:
"The views expressed in [the Ninth Circuit's] Bolanos-Hernandez and its progeny regard-
ing political neutrality as an expression of political conscience carve out an important
exception to the long-entrenched view that only overt acts of political expression consti-
tute 'political opinion' within the meaning of refugee protection provisions." Id.
91. See Andrioff, supra note 81, at 120.
92. Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1989).
93. See Perlera-Escobar v. Executive Office for Immigration, 894 F.2d 1292, 1298




3. Standard of Review.-Finally, the courts of appeals have
differed over the standard of review for BIA asylum decisions.95
The Refugee Act gave the Attorney General discretion to grant asy-
lum to an alien, and the courts unanimously reviewed that decision
on an abuse of discretion basis.96 However, a majority of courts,
namely the Second, 97  Fourth," Fifth,99  Sixth,' 00  Seventh,' 0 '
motive on the part of a guerrilla group "would create a sinkhole that would swallow the
rule." Id.
94. Petitioners' Brief at *37, Elias-Zacarias (No. 90-1342) (LEXIS, GENFED library,
Brief File). The government stated:
Substituting the persecutor's politics for the applicant's removes an essential
limit on the definition of "refugee" under the Act. Since guerrilla groups by
definition have political goals (overthrowing the incumbent government), any
person they attempt to coerce into performing military service would have a
"well-founded fear of persecution on account of ... political opinion."
Id.
95. With respect to review of withholding of deportation cases, however, the inter-
mediate appellate courts have unanimously agreed that the 1980 Act requires a height-
ened standard of review. See, e.g., McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1981)
("A factual determination is now required, and the Board must withhold deportation if
certain facts exist .... We conclude that factual findings under § 243(h) are subject to
review under the substantial-evidence test."). See also Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767
F.2d 1277, 1282 n.8 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that the 1980 Act established a "height-
ened, substantial evidence standard of review" for withholding of deportation deci-
sions). The Seventh Circuit has held similarly, as have "the majority of other circuits
that have addressed the matter." Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 569 (7th Cir.
1984). Whether this is the appropriate standard of review for withholding of deporta-
tion cases has yet to be addressed by the Supreme Court.
96. See Saleh v. United States Dep't of Justice, 962 F.2d 234, 238 (2d Cir. 1992);
Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d 702, 708 (10th Cir. 1991); Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588,
593 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 583 (1991); Melendez v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 926 F.2d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 1991); Ipina v. INS, 868 F.2d 511, 513 (1st Cir.
1989); Cruz-Lopez v. INS, 802 F.2d 1518, 1519 n.I (4th Cir. 1986); Youkhanna v. INS,
749 F.2d 360, 362 n.2 (6th Cir. 1984).
97. See Saleh, 962 F.2d at 238; Melendez, 926 F.2d at 217-18 (joining the "majority of
our sister circuits").
98. Cruz-Lopez, 802 F.2d at 1519 n.l (adopting the Ninth Circuit standard).
99. See Rojas v. INS, 937 F.2d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that "[tlhe substantial
evidence standard requires only that the Board's conclusion be based upon the evidence
presented and be substantially reasonable"). See also Farzad v. INS, 802 F.2d 123, 124
(5th Cir. 1986) ("We also are satisfied that the Board's determination that Farzad did
not demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution is supported by substantial
evidence.").
100. See Dawood-Haio v. INS, 800 F.2d 90, 97 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding that the INS
had no "rational basis for determining that petitioner is not, in fact, a refugee"). How-
ever, in Doe v. INS, the Sixth Circuit held that whether an alien has a well-founded fear of
persecution and thus comes under the statutory definition of a refugee eligible for asy-
lum is a question of fact reviewable under the "clearly erroneous" standard. 867 F.2d
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Eighth, 0 2 Ninth, 0 3 Tenth 10 4 and Eleventh,'0 5 more closely re-
viewed the INS's determination of refugee status. These circuits
viewed this component of the asylum decision as a question of fact
and therefore reversible if not supported by "substantial evidence."
For these courts, the substantial evidence standard allowed for close
scrutiny of the BIA's decisions. Other circuits, namely the First 0 6
285, 290 (6th Cir. 1989). This language describes a standard of review even more inten-
sive than that of "substantial evidence."
101. See Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 593 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 583
(1991); Balazoski v. INS, 932 F.2d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 1991). See also Carvajal-Munoz v.
INS, 743 F.2d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 1984). In Carvajal-Munoz, the Seventh Circuit
cautioned:
The granting of asylum, however, is discretionary under section 208, and ordi-
narily such a decision will be upheld unless it is found to be arbitrary, or capri-
cious, or an abuse of discretion. We note, however, that the exercise of that
discretion comes into play only after there has been a preliminary appraisal of
refugee status, which involves an issue of fact. Because the abuse of discretion
standard is not appropriate for reviewing factual findings regarding eligibility,
we hold that substantial evidence must support the finding regarding refugee
status.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
102. See Wojcik v. INS, 951 F.2d 172, 173 (8th Cir. 1991) (concluding that "there is
substantial evidence to support the BIA's finding that Wojcik no longer has a well-
founded fear of persecution by the Polish government on account of his Solidarity
activities").
103. See Arriaga-Barrientos v. INS, 925 F.2d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 1991) ("We review
the Board's denial of asylum and withholding of deportation for substantial evidence.
This standard is only slightly stricter than the clear error standard.") (citations omitted).
In Arriaga-Barrientos, the Ninth Circuit defined "substantial evidence" in a way that per-
mits increased judicial oversight. See also Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d 844, 848 (9th Cir.
1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992) ("We review the Board's factual findings under the
'substantial evidence' standard and reverse if the BIA's findings are not substantially
reasonable."); Rodriguez-Rivera v. INS, 848 F.2d 998, 1001 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Under the
substantial evidence standard, courts may not reverse the BIA simply because they disa-
gree with its evaluation of the facts. 'All the substantial evidence standard requires is
that the BIA's conclusion, based on the evidence presented, be substantially reason-
able.' ") (citations omitted).
104. See Opoku v. INS, No. 91-9555, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 16735, at *3 (10th Cir.
July 15, 1992) (not for publication) ("We review the factual findings underlying the
BIA's decision denying an application for asylum and prohibiting deportation for sub-
stantial evidence.") (citation omitted); Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d 702, 707 (10th Cir. 1991)
(also applying the substantial evidence standard).
105. See Perlera-Escobar v. Executive Office for Immigration, 894 F.2d 1292, 1296
(11 th Cir. 1990) ("A factual determination by the BIA that an alien is statutorily ineligi-
ble for asylum or withholding is reviewed under the substantial evidence test.") (cita-
tions omitted).
106. See Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1990) (referring to the "deferen-
tial 'substantial evidence' standard"); Novoa-Umania v. INS, 896 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.




and Third, 10 7 viewed "substantial evidence" as requiring a highly
deferential asylum standard. The disagreement over the meaning of
"substantial evidence" reflected a wider confusion over the differ-
ences, if any, between the substantial evidence and abuse of discre-
tion standards of review.10 8
4. Court Patterns.-The most recent prior Supreme Court deci-
sion on immigration, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-
Fonseca,'0 9 constituted a victory for refugee advocates, establishing a
more lenient standard of proof for granting asylum than that for-
warded by the government." 0 However, the strong conservative
dissent by Justice Powell"' and the grudgingly composed concur-
rence by Justice Scalia" 2 indicated the possibility that the Court
would swing in a different direction in future cases.' 13
IV. ANALYSIS
Elias-Zacarias left untouched the Supreme Court's earlier deci-
sions establishing standards of proof for asylum and withholding of
deportation. The Court focused on the definition of "refugee" in
the asylum section of the Refugee Act and the ability of the courts of
appeals to review the BIA's decision as to whether a particular alien
meets that definition.
107. SeeJanusiak v. INS, 947 F.2d 46, 47 (3rd Cir. 1991); Sankar v. INS, 757 F.2d 532,
533 (3rd Cir. 1985); Sotto v. INS, 748 F.2d 832, 836-37 (3rd Cir. 1984). The Third
Circuit is the only circuit to adopt the abuse of discretion standard for both steps of the
asylum decision. Melendez v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 926 F.2d 211, 217 (2d Cir.
1991).
108. For a detailed explanation of whether the "arbitrary or capricious" standard dif-
fers from the "substantial evidence" standard, see 5 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw TREATISE § 29:7, 356-63 (2d ed. 1984). Professor Culp's treatise explains:
The law is, then, all at one time, that the one test requires more than the other,
that the other requires more than the one, and that the difference between the
two tests is largely semantic! If the lawmakers had a malevolent purpose of
preventing clarity (as surely they do not), could they accomplish that purpose
more effectively?
Id. at 359.
109. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
110. Id. at 448-50.
111. Id. at 455-69 (Powell,J., dissenting). Justices Rehnquist and White joined Justice
Powell's dissent.
112. Id. at 452-55 (Scalia, J., concurring).
113. But see Helton, supra note 68, at 51-52 (predicting, based on the Cardoza-Fonseca
decision, that the Court would adopt a "liberal construction of such concepts as 'polit-




A. "Persecution on Account of... Political Opinion"' '4
The Court decisively rejected the notion that forced conscrip-
tion constituted "persecution on account of . . . political opin-
ion."" 5 The Court gave three reasons for its adamant rejection of
this proposition.
First, the Court refused to accept political neutrality as a "polit-
ical opinion" within the meaning of the statute: "Elias-Zacarias ap-
pears to argue that not taking sides with any political faction is itself
the affirmative expression of a political opinion. That seems to us
not ordinarily so . . " '16 Thus, the Court rejected the Ninth Cir-
cuit's argument, expressed in Zacarias and its preceding decisions,
that a conscious decision to remain politically neutral did satisfy the
definition of "political opinion.""' 7 The Court ignored the Ninth
Circuit's concern that not recognizing political neutrality would un-
dermine a "basic" purpose of the Refugee Act of 1980 because it
would limit protection to ideological extremists.""
The Court categorized Elias-Zacarias' position as apolitical and
then rejected the notion that aliens could take seemingly political
positions for apolitical reasons and still qualify for asylum'9-an
idea supported by the Ninth Circuit and the dissenters in the Elias-
114. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988).
115. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 816 (1992).
116. Id. However, the Court carefully noted it did not need to "decide whether the
evidence compels the conclusion that Elias-Zacarias held a political opinion." Id.
117. See Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1286 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Choosing
to remain neutral is no less a political decision than is choosing to affiliate with a particu-
lar political faction. . . . When a person is aware of contending political forces and
affirmatively chooses not to join any faction, that choice is a political one."); Rodriguez-
Rivera v. INS, 848 F.2d 998, 1004 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Political neutrality clearly may con-
stitute political opinion within the meaning of Section 1101(a)(42)(A)."). The Ninth
Circuit's view had provoked internal disagreement, with one circuit judge warning that
recognizing political neutrality would "eviscerate[ I the political opinion requirement of
the statute." Mendoza Perez v. INS, 902 F.2d 760, 767 (9th Cir. 1990) (Sneed, J., con-
curring specially). As Judge Sneed stated, "It means that a politically inactive alien, and
perhaps most aliens are, may now gain the protection of asylum." Id. He added that the
inclusion of political neutrality was a "distortion of the historical purposes of asylum"
and that "political activism underlies the concept of 'refugee' status." Id.
118. See Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1286. The Ninth Circuit explained:
A rule that one must identify with one of two dominant warring political fac-
tions in order to possess a political opinion, when many persons may, in fact, be
opposed to the views and policies of both, would frustrate one of the basic
objectives of the Refugee Act of 1980-to provide protection to all victims of
persecution regardless of ideology.
Id.
119. See Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 815-16.
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Zacarias decision.' Justice Scalia speculated that Elias-Zacarias' re-
fusal to join the guerrillas could have many non-political bases, in-
cluding "fear of combat, a desire to remain with one's family and
friends, [and] a desire to earn a better living in civilian life .... 121
According to the Court, the actions for which applicants claim they
will be persecuted must have had a clear political motivation; that is,
the aliens must have consciously attempted to make a political state-
ment through their words or actions. In the future, this argument
may be used to exclude aliens who, while lacking an actual political
opinion, are mistakenly perceived as holding one.' 22
Second, the Court determined that the "political opinion" must
belong to the alien rather than the persecutor.' 23 The Court found
that "[t]he ordinary meaning of the phrase 'persecution on account
of... political opinion' in § 101 (a) (42) is persecution on account of
the victim's political opinion, not the persecutor's."'124 The politics
120. See id. at 818 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Even if the refusal is motivated by noth-
ing more than a simple desire to continue living an ordinary life with one's family, it is
the kind of political expression that the asylum provisions of the statute were intended
to protect."); Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 812
(1992) ("[T]he person resisting forced recruitment is expressing a political opinion hos-
tile to the persecutor ...."). In Bolanos-Hernandez, the Ninth Circuit considered the fact
that the guerrillas would view the alien's motives as political even though his motiva-
tions were not, in fact, political. Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1286.
121. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 816. It is unclear whether the Court established a
requirement that the victim's actions be based exclusively on his political opinion. Many
aliens, particularly those from Central America, have "mixed motives for applying for
asylum." Preston, supra note 52, at 123. Immigrants frequently flee for a difficult-to-
distinguish combination of economic and political reasons. "[T]he distinction between
economic and political motives is often blurred or artificial .... The applicant must be
considered a refugee only if his primary motivation is political." Id.
122. The Court recognized this risk but did not fully evaluate it, stating only "there [is
not] any indication (assuming, arguendo, it would suffice) that the guerrillas erroneously
believed that Elias-Zacarias' refusal was politically based." Elias-Zacaias, 112 S. Ct. at
816.
123. See id.
124. Id. Justice Scalia used a conventional linguistic argument to justify his interpre-
tation of the "ordinary meaning" of the statute. "If a Nazi regime persecutes Jews, it is
not, within the ordinary meaning of language, engaging in persecution on account of
political opinion; and if a fundamentalist Moslem regime persecutes democrats, it is not
engaging in persecution on account of religion." Id. Thus, Justice Scalia decided that
the victim's characteristics-not the persecutor's-determine the nature of the persecu-
tion.
In his limited set of examples, however, Justice Scalia ignores the full array of possi-
ble scenarios. For example, if a fundamentalist religious regime persecutes all atheists
in a country, the only way possible to explain the nature of the persecution is through
the religion of the persecutor. If one were to apply Justice Scalia's methodology, one
could conclude that because the victim has no religion, this persecution must not be
religious. Thus, in this case, Justice Scalia's analysis results in absurd conclusions.
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of the persecutor are not relevant. 125 The majority thereby rejected
the Ninth Circuit's view that the politics of both victim and persecu-
tor should be examined as part of the asylum decision. The Ninth
Circuit, in an earlier decision, had refused to give the federal statute
such a "restrictive or mechanical ... construction," stating:
"Persecution" occurs only when there is a difference be-
tween the persecutor's views or status and that of the vic-
tim; it is oppression which is inflicted on groups or
individuals because of a difference that the persecutor will
not tolerate. For this reason, in determining whether
threats or violence constitute political persecution, it is
permissible to examine the motivation of the persecutor;
we may look at the political views and actions of the entity
or individual responsible for the threats or violence, as well
as to the victim's, and we may examine the relationship be-
tween the two. 1
26
The Supreme Court, however, did not hesitate to adopt this "re-
strictive or mechanical . . . construction." In so doing, the Court
eliminated from consideration for refugee status those who lack
overt political positions themselves, but who are adversely affected
by groups with clear political agendas.' 27
Finally, the Court indicated that the persecution must stem
from the persecutor's displeasure with the victim's political opin-
ion. 12 The Court found that Elias-Zacarias failed this test because
the guerrillas were motivated by a desire to increase their army and
not because they disliked Elias-Zacarias' neutral position. 29 In
Arteaga v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Ninth Circuit had
rejected the need to examine whether the persecutor's motives to-
wards the victim were specifically targeted at the victim's political
views.' 3 ° In that decision, the Ninth Circuit required only that the
general motive of the persecutor be political in nature.
125. Id.
126. Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).
127. See Gibney, supra note 56, at 33, 49 ("Under a strict reading of this definition,
those fleeing wars, or seeking refuge from mass slaughter, are often not considered
bona fide refugees because they are not singled out for persecution, nor is the persecu-
tion necessarily based on one of those five factors."); see also Cavosie, supra note 49, at
414 n.23 (noting that the definition does not include "persons fleeing natural disasters,
war and starvation").
128. See Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 816.
129. Id. at 816 n.2.
130. See Arteaga, 836 F.2d 1227, 1232 n.8 (9th Cir. 1988).
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It is not relevant that the guerrillas may have been inter-
ested in conscripting Arteaga to fill their ranks rather than
to "punish" Arteaga's neutrality. To find political persecu-
tion, all we need inquire of the guerrillas' motive is
whether that motive is political. Clearly, forced recruit-
ment into the war against the government is politically
motivated. 131
The Court's holding in Elias-Zacarias significantly narrowed the
definition of refugee. But it is important to note that the withhold-
ing of deportation section also uses the phrase "persecution on ac-
count of . . . political opinion."'' 3 2  In the future, the Court's
decision will undoubtedly be extended to withholding of deporta-
tion applications. The effect will be that obtaining asylum and with-
holding of deportation will be significantly more difficult for aliens
than in the past.
B. Standard of Review
The Supreme Court rejected the proposition, which was held
by a majority of the courts of appeals, that refugee status is a factual
determination subject to a substantial evidence standard of review.
Rather, it established an even more deferential standard of review
for asylum and deportation cases. 1 This will significantly restrict
the ability of the circuit courts to reverse BIA rulings.'" 4
Before Elias-Zacarias, many circuits recognized that the Refugee
Act of 1980 gave the Attorney General great discretion in granting
asylum.' 3 5 However, several circuits held that the threshold step to
that decision-determination of whether an applicant met the defi-
131. Id. (citations omitted).
132. The Refugee Act of 1980 § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988). See supra text
accompanying note 18 for the full text of the section.
133. See Elias-Zacaras, 112 S. Ct. at 815 (noting that the BIA decision may only be
reversed if "a reasonable fact-finder would have to conclude that the requisite fear of perse-
cution existed" (emphasis added)). If the immigration judge, who failed to find the req-
uisite fear, is considered by the reviewing court to be a reasonable fact-finder (which
must be assumed in all but the most egregious cases), the test effectively can never be
met.
134. See id. at 817 ("[T]o obtainjudicial reversal of the BIA's determination [an alien]
must show that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of
persecution.").
135. See supra note 96 for a list of circuits recognizing the Attorney General's discre-
tion. See also Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 567-68 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[I]f the
immigration judge finds that the applicant qualifies as a 'refugee,' but nonetheless de-
cides to deny the applicant asylum in the exercise of the judge's discretion, we will not
overturn the decision unless it was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.").
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nition of "refugee"-was a question of fact.' 3 6 Under traditional
rules, the test was that an administrative agency's findings of fact
could be reversed if it was not supported by substantial evidence.13 7
The Ninth Circuit had previously applied this standard to a number
of other situations involving decisions by the BIA and other admin-
istrative agencies. 138 But some Ninth Circuit judges had also recog-
nized that circuits sometimes used an abuse of discretion standard,
thereby giving greater deference to the BIA rulings. 139 On a policy
level, some commentators decried the pattern of courts of appeals
reversals of BIA decisions as improper interference that prevented
the establishment of a uniform national asylum policy.' 4 °
The Supreme Court had not resolved this disparity among the
circuits. However, in his dissent in Cardoza-Fonseca, Justice Powell
espoused the more conservative view that the BIA, as an administra-
tive agency, should be granted wide latitude.'14  Justice Powell im-
plied that the only grounds on which he would have overturned the
BIA's interpretation of the statute would have been if that interpre-
tation was "unreasonable."' 42 Referring to the BIA as an "expert
agency," he argued that the standard of review issue for both asy-
lum and withholding of deportation was "a question best answered
136. See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
137. See NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 299-300
(1939). The Columbian Enameling Court stated:
[T]his, as in the case of other findings by administrative bodies, means evidence
which is substantial, that is, affording a substantial basis of fact from which the
fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. ... Substantial evidence is more than a
scintilla, and must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact
to be established.
Id. (citations omitted).
138. See McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Agency findings
arising from public, record-producing proceedings are normally subject to the substan-
tial-evidence standard."). The Ninth Circuit also applied a more stringent standard of
review when the immigration judge and BIA disagreed. Id. at 1318.
139. See Mendoza Perez v. INS, 902 F.2d 760, 765 (9th Cir. 1990) (Sneed, J., concur-
ring specially) ("This circuit makes it easier than any other for an alien to argue success-
fully that a decision by an immigration judge is not supported by substantial
evidence.... Other circuits that have articulated explicitly the standard of review follow
the abuse of discretion standard.") (citations omitted).
140. See Martin, supra note 52, at 1272-73 (noting that each circuit had established its
own standards and definitions, and that "the Supreme Court is not in a position to re-
solve more than a handful of such disputes").
141. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 460 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984). In
Chevron, Justice Stevens wrote that where Congress had implicitly delegated authority to
an agency, "a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency." Id. at 844.
142. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 461.
1993] LIMITING POLITICAL ASYLUM 499
by an entity familiar with the types of evidence and issues that arise
in such cases."' 143 In his Cardoza-Fonseca concurrence, Justice Scalia
also expressed his concern that the majority had tolerated less def-
erence to the BIA than was warranted.' 44
Justice Scalia finally secured a majority for his deferential posi-
tion in Elias-Zacarias. Without great explanation, the Court rejected
the Ninth Circuit's approach and applied an abuse of discretion
standard to both the refugee determination and the decision
whether to grant asylum. 145 The Court quoted the portion of the
INA indicating that a court of appeals must affirm the agency's
"findings of fact, if supported by reasonable, substantial, and proba-
tive evidence on the record considered as a whole .... Justice
Scalia interpreted this language to mean that a court of appeals
could reverse the BIA only if the evidence existed so strongly in the
alien's favor that it compelled any reasonable fact-finder to find in
favor of the alien.' 47 The Court did not explain why it read this
language in this particular way. If one places emphasis on the word
"reasonable," then the standard is similar to that of abuse of discre-
tion. However, if one places emphasis on the word "substantial,"
the standard is closer to the Ninth Circuit's more generous substan-
tial evidence test. Justice Scalia clearly took the former view. 148
The Court's decision will greatly limit the ability of the courts of
appeals to review BIA decisions for consistency, fairness, and appro-
priateness. Only glaringly unreasonable decisions will be over-
turned. 49 Thus, BIA decisions, and the ideological biases upon
143. See id. at 460.
144. See id. at 454 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia explained:
The Court first implies that courts may substitute their interpretation of a stat-
ute for that of an agency whenever, "[e]mploying traditional tools of statutory
construction," they are able to reach a conclusion as to the proper interpreta-
tion of the statute. But this approach would make deference a doctrine of
desperation, authorizing courts to defer only if they would otherwise be unable
to construe the enactment at issue. This is not an interpretation but an eviscer-
ation of Chevron.
Id. (citations omitted).
145. Although the Court did not expressly label the standard "abuse of discretion,"
Justice Scalia's construction of the "substanial . . . evidence" standard makes the two
practically equivalent.
146. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 815 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) (1988)).
147. See id. at 815; id. at 815 n.l ("To reverse the BIA finding we must find that the
evidence not only supports that conclusion, but compels it .....
148. See id. at 817.
149. Lower federal courts have already adopted Elias-Zacarias' dictate. See, e.g., Klawit-
ter v. INS, 970 F.2d 149, 151 (6th Cir. 1992) ("[I]n order to reverse the BIA's factual
determinations, the reviewing court must find that the evidence not only supports a
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which they may be based, will go largely unchecked by the
judiciary.' 5 0
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the Court's con-
struction of the term "substantial evidence" will likely affect the ju-
dicial review of agency decisions in areas other than immigration
law. Notably, the broadly applicable Administrative Procedures Act
uses the same key language. 15 '
C. Statutory Construction
Before Elias-Zacarias, the Supreme Court adhered to "the long-
standing principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in depor-
tation statutes in favor of the alien."' 52 This policy was based on the
Court's sense of the seriousness of deporting someone into a poten-
tially dangerous position. 153 After Elias-Zacarias, this tendency is
seen in the views of only a minority of the Justices. ' 54 In Elias-
Zacarias, the Court interpreted the statutory terms "political opin-
ion" and "persecution" in a way that substantially and adversely af-
fects an alien with a questionable claim.
In making its decision, the Elias-Zacarias Court focused almost
exclusively on the words of the statute itself, with little acknowl-
edgement of the intent and history behind the language. An "ordi-
contrary conclusion, but indeed compels it."). See also Abedini v. INS, 971 F.2d 188, 191
(9th Cir. 1992); Sivaainkaran v. INS, 972 F.2d 161, 163 (7th Cir. 1992).
150. This would be contrary to the legislative intent of the Refugee Act of 1980. See S.
REP. No. 96-256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 144
("[T]he new statutory definition.., eliminates the geographical and ideological restric-
tions now applicable to conditional entrant refugees .... ").
151. See Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 7, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1988) (provid-
ing for "consideration of the whole record or those parts thereof cited by a party and
supported by and in accordance with the reliable, probative and substantial evidence").
152. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987); Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at
819 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Cardoza-Fonseca with approval). See also Costello v.
INS, 376 U.S. 120, 128 (1964) (stating that "accepted principles of statutory construc-
tion in this area of the law [are] to resolve that doubt in favor of the petitioner"); id. at
148 (White, J., dissenting) ("I have no quarrel with the doctrine that where the Court is
unable to discern the intent of Congress, ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the
deportee .... "); INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966) ("[T]he doubt should be
resolved in favor of the alien" even when the statute's literal interpretation argues other-
wise.). But see INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 196 (1984) (holding that the "continu-
ous presence requirement" for an alien to qualify for suspension of deportation should
be strictly interpreted as allowing no exceptions).
153. See Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) ("We resolve the doubts in
favor of [the alien] because deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent
of banishment or exile.") (citations omitted).
154. See Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 819 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (The Court "should
resolve any doubts concerning the political character of an alien's refusal to take arms
against a legitimate government in favor of the alien.").
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nary meaning" approach had surfaced periodically in the Court's
previous statutory construction decisions. 155 This interpretive tech-
nique, however, earned only limited recognition with regard to im-
migration law prior to Elias-Zacarias.1"' Yet, Justice Scalia's Cardoza-
Fonseca concurrence provided a preview of its emerging form.
Rejecting the majority's willingness to consider " 'clearly ex-
pressed legislative intention' contrary to [the statutory] lan-
guage,"' 157 Justice Scalia in Cardoza-Fonseca asserted that the Court
should never go beyond the clear, "plain meaning" of statutory lan-
guage in the "absence of patent absurdity."' 58 Where the words
themselves are unambiguous, examination of the legislative history
is "gratuitous" and inappropriate. 5 9
155. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962) ("[W~e must, of course, start
with the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of
the words used."). See also Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 431 (" 'With regard to this very
statutory scheme [of immigration], we have considered ourselves bound to 'assume' that
the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.' ")
(quoting INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984), in turn quoting American To-
bacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982), in turn quoting Richards v. United
States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962)).
156. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 457 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell argued
in favor of strictly interpreting the words "well-founded" as they were used to modify
"fear." Id. Compare Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120, 124 (1964) (refusing to consider
statutory language regarding denaturalization "plain" when the petitioner's and the
INS's interpretations were "both possible readings of the statute") with Phinpathya, 464
U.S. at 189-96 (using the plain meaning doctrine to hold that "Congress meant what it
said" regarding the INA's continuous presence requirement, and adding "when Con-
gress in the past has intended for a 'continuous physical presence' requirement to be
flexibly administered, it has provided the authority for doing so").
157. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 432 n.12. In other immigration cases, this interpre-
tive approach has been persuasively forwarded. See Phinpathya, 464 U.S. at 198 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan explained:
It is a hornbook proposition that "[a]ll laws should receive a sensible construc-
tion. General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to
injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be
presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language, which would
avoid results of this character. The reason of the law in such cases should pre-
vail over its letter."
Id. (quoting United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 486-87 (1869)). See also Costello, 376
U.S. at 133-34 n.1 (White, J., dissenting) ("This Court has repeatedly stressed the prin-
ciple that in construing statutes 'the general purpose is a more important aid to the
meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down.' ") (quoting United
States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135, 143 (1905).
158. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 452-53 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Judges interpret
laws rather than reconstruct legislators' intentions. Where the language of those laws is
clear, we are not free to replace it with an unenacted legislative intent."). Taken to an
extreme, however, Justice Scalia's analyses could lead to absurd conclusions. See supra
note 124.
159. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 453 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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In Elias-Zacarias, the Court adopted and reaffirmed this method
of statutory construction,' 60 despite apparent ambiguities in the piv-
otal terms. Justice Scalia focused purely on the text of the INA stat-
ute and its plain meaning. He held, "The ordinary meaning of the
phrase 'persecution on account of ... political opinion' in [section]
101 (a) (42) is persecution on account of the victim's political opinion,
not the persecutor's."' 6 1 In so finding, he made an important statu-
tory distinction where none existed previously by rejecting the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the crucial statutory language.162
Further, Justice Scalia quite possibly may have circumvented the
congressional intent behind the Refugee Act of 1980 to prevent
ideologically slanted and arbitrary decisions. 63
CONCLUSION
The Elias-Zacarias decision will make avoidance of deportation
and qualification for political asylum more difficult for aliens who
fear political persecution. They will be required, at their first ad-
ministrative hearing, to show that they have a "well-founded fear"
of persecution which is the direct result of an actual, explicit and
conscious political statement on their part. In addition, the courts
will have diminished authority to oversee decisions of the BIA. The
standard of review is now virtually solidified as abuse of discretion
for the entire decision, including the determination of whether an
alien meets the definition of "refugee." No longer will immigration
statutes be applied to favor aliens.
The reach of Elias-Zacarias will extend beyond immigration dis-
putes. The Court's decision decreases the ability of federal courts
to look behind statutory language to reveal deeper meanings and
legislative intent. Justice Scalia's fixation on the "plain meaning" of
the actual words themselves has won a majority position.
MATrHEW H. JOSEPH
160. See Elas-Zacaias, 112 S. Ct. at 816 ("In construing statutes, 'we must, of course,
start with the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary mean-
ing of the words used.' " (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962))).
161. Id.
162. See supra notes 117-121 and accompanying text.
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